Although the cultural and political context of separatism in Quebec is different from that of the Catalan independence movement, the history of the former could shed light on the future of the latter.
Catalan separatist nationalism could afford to learn a lesson or two from Quebecois separatism. Although we’re talking about two very different historical, cultural and political realities, the blows dealt to pro-independence actors in Canada’s province of Quebec could shed light on the future of their Catalan peers. The first lesson is that quasi-victory or quasi-defeat always results in a loss of heart among secessionists. The other lesson is that time dilutes the strength of independentist feeling among most voters. You’re ultimately left with the radicals, pitching their own tent, and with more lukewarm sovereignty activists preferring to found their own party.
In the case of Quebec there were two referendums to ask the province’s population whether they wanted to separate from or renegotiate their status in the Canadian federation. The first was held in 1980. The federalist ‘No’ option won, carrying nearly 60% of votes. The second referendum was held in 1995. The (federalist) ‘No’ barely managed a 50,58% majority of votes on that occasion. Since that moment, the main secessionist party in the province, the Parti Québecois, has at times held power again, but secessionism has declined.
There are several reasons for this. The first is that the independentist front in Quebec has splintered, from the left-wing radicals to accommodationist centrists seeking new compromises with the rest of Canada. The second reason has to do with immigration, as newer Quebecois prefer the safety of staying in the bosom of Canada to the uncertainty of potential secession. And these voters lean towards the openly federalist provincial liberal party. The third reason is generational. The young no longer feel identified with the cause of independence. In any case, they move more easily between different political options. For instance, they’ve gone from enthusiastically voting for the social-democratic left of the New Democratic Party to voting for traditional Liberals in the federal elections. On the other hand, the Québecois Block, which represents the interests of the sovereignty movement in Canadian parliament, has been reduced to a very small representation, after at some point having been the official opposition in Canada.
Of course it’s dangerous to extrapolate. In Quebec, most of the secessionist movement has had social-democratic sympathies, with a minority further to the left. In Catalonia, the separatist coalition brings together right-wing elites and left-wing radicals who support dismantling the European Union. This rather unnatural coalition is based on a coincidence of ‘passionate interests’ (the term is sociologist Bruno Latour’s) mobilising sectors which would otherwise have nothing in common. There are also constitutional differences. The Quebec parliament never voted the constitution which was ‘repatriated’ from the UK in 1982 by then Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (father to Canada’s current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau). Catalonia, by contrast, voted the Spanish constitution of 1978 and also has a Statute of Autonomy which was approved in referendum by Catalanas in 2006, though a preamble declaring the ‘Catalan nation’ and a further 14 articles were declared invalid by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010.
Yet it’s important to note that vague or non-existent definitions ultimately weaken secessionism in democratic contexts. The two defeats suffered by Quebec’s separatists certainly dampened enthusiasm for the cause. Even the secessionists’ ambiguity hurt them.
Mi memorable professor of research methodology at the University of Montreal, the prematurely late Luc Giroux, taught us that the key to a good opinion poll is a set of possible answers which don’t allow for ambiguity in their interpretation. He used to cite the example of the first referendum held by Quebec’s pro-sovereignty government in 1980 to see whether the province’s inhabitants wanted to separate from the rest of Canada.
Our professor used to tell us that the question posed by the Quebecois Party was ambiguous and, therefore, so were the answers. The long question went more or less as follows: the government of Quebec has made public its proposal to arrive at an agreement with the rest of Canada in order to reach a new agreement giving the province full sovereignty and allowing it to remain in economic association with Canada, including keeping the same currency. Are you in favour of granting the government of Quebec a mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?
Nearly 60% of voters rejected the sovereignty/association agreement proposed by the Quebecois Party. According to professor Giroux, that 60% probably included all sorts of views. Some were surely anti-independence, while others were possibly hardline quebecois independence supporters who did not want to negotiate with Canada, but rather declare the absolute sovereignty of Quebec. Their ‘no’ was different from the ‘no’ of those who wanted to stay in Canada. This was a typical case of an ambiguous question which in turn generated ambiguity in the interpretation of the answers.
It’s likely that the purported ‘victory’ claimed by Catalan secessionists in the referendum of 1 October is their main weakness. The president of the regional government, Carles Puigdemont, basing his action on the results of this so-called referendum, declared the independence of Catalonia on 10 October, but immediately announced that the effects of that declaration were not to come into effect for the time being. As in the case of Quebec, this ‘quasi-victory’ or ‘quasi-defeat’ might splinter the Catalan pro-independence movement, generating confrontation between radicals and accommodationists — that is, it might weaken the secessionist movement.
